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Abstract
Between 1949 and 1989, communism restricted private entrepreneurship in East
Germany, but even after reunification in 1990 entrepreneurship remained low com-
pared to other transition economies. To quantify the determinants of low en-
trepreneurship in East Germany and its impact on economic outcomes, I set up
a two-region model economy with occupational and migration choices. Individu-
als can become workers or entrepreneurs in East or West Germany. In line with
German policy after reunification, in East Germany wages are fixed above labor
productivity and there are capital subsidies. Managerial knowhow is a combination
of innate talent and entrepreneurial parental background which only West Germans
possess. Technological growth increases with the innate talent of entrepreneurs.
Counter-factual experiments show that the missing tradition of entrepreneurship,
while contributing to technological growth, accounts for almost 10 percentage points
of the gap between East and West German GDP per capita. On the other hand, re-
unification (wage setting policy, migration possibilities, and subsidies) slowed down
technological growth and increased the output gap by 7 percentage points.
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1 Introduction
For the last two decades, economic growth in East Germany has been lower than in
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.1 In 2012, unemployment rates in East Ger-
many were still almost twice as high and GDP per capita was around 76% compared
to West Germany (Halle Institute for Economic Research [2014] and Bundesagentur fu¨r
Arbeit [2008]). Between 2005 and 2019, 156 billion Euros of financial aid (Solidarpakt II)
will flow to East German states. Policy makers often point to the lack of entrepreneurship
as one of East Germany’s main problems: “The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) and its Local Economic and Employment Development Pro-
gramme has been working with the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban
Affairs (BMVBS) since 2005 on an analytical and practical project on Strengthening en-
trepreneurship in East Germany as a critical lever for economic growth and employment
creation”(OECD [2007a]). Between 1949 and 1989, while West Germany’s enterprise sec-
tor flourished, communism restricted private entrepreneurship in East Germany, and after
reunification “[s]mall businessmen in east Germany fac[ed] a number of handicaps, mostly
to do with being new to the game;” (Economist [1996]).
How decisive was the missing tradition of entrepreneurship for economic outcomes in East
Germany? Faced with a strong entrepreneurship tradition in West Germany, would eco-
nomic outcomes have been better in an independent East Germany? In order to address
these questions – both qualitatively and quantitatively – I build a two-region model of
occupational choice a la Lucas’ [1978]. Individuals differ in managerial knowhow which is
a combination of innate talent and parental background in entrepreneurship, i.e. children
of entrepreneurs observe how to run a business, inherit networks of clients and providers,
etc. All East Germans as children of workers face a disadvantage. Given their managerial
knowhow, individuals decide to be unemployed, to work, or to set up a business. They
can also pay a moving cost and work or set up a business in the other part of Germany.
While there are common capital and goods markets, labor markets of the two Germanies
are locally separated. In line with German policy after reunification, wages in East Ger-
many are fixed above labor productivity and as fractions of West German wages. The
government pays important subsidies to the rental rate of capital to entrepreneurs in
East Germany. Following Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2000] low technological growth
implies a slowly changing business environment, and past information about how to run
a business is valuable. Children of entrepreneurs have more managerial knowhow and
they – rather than the most talented individuals – set up businesses. Given that only
1Accumulated growth rates for real GDP per capita for 2000 to 2013 for East Germany, Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic and Germany are 23%, 144%, 163%, and 77% and 37% respectively,
see Figure A-1 of the Appendix A.
the innate talent of entrepreneurs matters for technological growth, individuals’ occupa-
tional choices exert an externality. Given lower managerial knowhow and higher wages,
more East Germans decide to work instead of setting up a business. The most talented
East Germans set up businesses in West Germany, contributing to growth there. In East
Germany, few mediocre entrepreneurs imply low growth. Too many workers and too few
entrepreneurs together with fixed wages lead to involuntary unemployment in East Ger-
many. Counter-factual experiments show that compared to the benchmark reunification
scenario, the missing tradition of entrepreneurship led to 5% higher technological growth,
but 34% fewer entrepreneurs in East Germany, accounting for 17% lower GDP per capita
and 10 percentage points higher unemployment. On the other hand, had East Germany
remained an independent country - without migration possibilities, wage setting policy,
nor subsidies - growth and GDP per capita would have been higher (13%) and unemploy-
ment would have been 7 percentage points lower.
The current paper contributes to the literature by applying the theory on social mobility
and economic growth as in Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2000] to the context of eco-
nomic transition. In 1990, after fifty years of living under communist rule, a generation
of individuals did not possess any parental background in entrepreneurship. This raises
the natural question of the implications for current entrepreneurship and economic out-
comes. Germany is a particularly interesting case because entrepreneurship tradition had
remained strong in the Western part.2 To the best of my knowledge, the current paper
is the first one to explicitly model the link between a missing entrepreneurship tradition
and current economic outcomes in East Germany within a general equilibrium model.3
While parental background in entrepreneurship has a positive effect on becoming an en-
trepreneur, the resulting intergenerational occupational and social transmission is asso-
ciated with low economic growth.4 On the other hand, high rates of technological and
economic growth reduce the value of knowhow passed on from past generations leading
to higher intergenerational occupational and social mobility.5 Both relationships: (1)
2Conceptually this paper is also related to empirical studies that exploit the incidence of economic
transition as a natural experiment to study entrepreneurship as e.g. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln [2009] and Bur-
chardi and Hassan [2013].
3Bajona and Locay [2009] consider the period before transition and establish a similar link between a
reduced stock of managerial knowledge and low growth rates for planned economies.
4Pistrui et al [2000] find that 60% of West German entrepreneurs have a parent who had been an en-
trepreneur. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin [2000] find intergenerational linkage in self-employment to be stronger
along non-financial lines than along financial lines. Arenius and Minniti [2005] find that simply knowing
other entrepreneurs is positively and significantly related to being a nascent entrepreneur.
5Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2000] bring forward various empirical evidence on the negative rela-
tionship between technological and economic growth and the value of parental background.
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between parental background in entrepreneurship and economic growth and (2) between
economic growth and social mobility arise in the model of this paper and have been treated
by larger literature.6 For instance, Caselli and Gennaioli [2012] show that missing mar-
kets result in the prevalence of dynastic firms and that managers being selected according
to family ties rather than talent leads to lower total factor productivity. In Galor and
Tsiddon [1997] parental background and growth are negatively related and as technology
adoption evolves, parental background gains importance, wages become more equal, and
technological progress slows down. The current paper is also related to the literature on
cross-border flows of managerial talent, see e.g. Burnstein and Monge [2009], or Pica and
Rodr´ıguez Mora [2011].
There is a general consensus that the wage setting policy has been the main cause for
East Germany’s high unemployment rates; see Hunt [2008] for a review of this literature.
In 1991, wages in East Germany were set to 50% of West German wages despite a lower
ratio of East- to West German labor productivities. By 1995, East German wages had
reached 70% of West German wages (Sinn [2002], and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Izem [2012]).7
Snower and Merkl [2006] argue that high unemployment rates in East Germany are a con-
sequence of the wage setting policy together with generous welfare provisions. Canova
and Ravn [2000] find that welfare provisions magnified the contraction of output and em-
ployment caused by differences in skill level and capital endowment. According to Burda
and Hunt [2001] the policy of fixing relatively high East German wages had a dampening
effect on East-West migration. In the model of the current paper, individuals expect
wages above labor productivity to cause an excess supply of labor, and that with a cer-
tain probability they will be involuntarily unemployed. This positive probability causes
expected wages to be lower and thus migration to be higher compared to a scenario with
flexible wages. In the framework of a labor search model, Uhlig [2006] argues that low
productivity and high out-migration rates are due to low levels of networking caused by
a lack of established production. Similarly, the current paper considers how a lack of
established production implies lower managerial knowhow and how this affects economic
outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents empirical
6For a seminal paper on the topic see Murphy et al [1991].
7Presumably in order to restrict the number of East Germans migrating to West Germany, West
German labor unions pressed for parity of wages (see e.g. Akerlof et al [1991], Sinn [2002]). Officially,
labor unions demanded wage equity out of concern for East-West German equity and East German
welfare. In addition, fixed wages impeded an offsetting of initial effects of the currency union between
West and East Germany. Wages in Poland and the Czech Republic remained stable at around 10-20%
relative to West German wages between 1990 and 1997 (Sinn [2002]).
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evidence on entrepreneurship and migration in East Germany. Section 3 presents the
model and Section 4 the calibration strategy. Then, Section 5 presents the results and
counterfactual experiments. Section 6 concludes.
2 Entrepreneurship and Migration in East Germany
Between 1949 and 1989, private entrepreneurial activity was extremely restricted in East
Germany, but also in other transition countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Hungary.8 Today, there are significantly fewer enterprises in East Germany, see Table 2.1.9
In particular, there are 15%, 75%, and 163% fewer firms compared to Poland, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia respectively. Numbers are similar when considering enterprises per
labor force participants or employees, see Table A1 of the Appendix A.6.
Table 2.1: Enterprises per 1000 inhabitants
West Germany East Germany Czech
Year (incl. firms with zero employment) Republic Poland Hungary
2002 32 26 86 39 55
2003 33 26 86 38 55
2004 35 30 86 38 56
2005 35 30 84 37 55
2006 36 32 84 38 54
2007 37 32 86 39 56
Data: Eurostat [2005] (NACE: C-I;K), Statistisches Bundesamt [2008] (for Germany)
Can the attractive outside option of migrating to West Germany explain the low rate
of entrepreneurship in East Germany? East Germany has been losing around 0.5% of
8In Hungary, liberalization of communist rules began in the 1970’s and by the 1980’s a so-called
’second economy’ of privately owned businesses had developed. The private sector was officially non-
existent in Czechoslovakia but more important in Poland where family farms dominated in agriculture
(OECD [1992]).
9Even though formal aspects of doing business are actually more favorable in Germany than in other
transition countries (World Bank [2009]). Earle and Sakova [2000] point out that high rates of unem-
ployment and little welfare provision in transition countries might push individuals into self-employment
and thus far from being successful business owners these own-account workers differ little from the un-
employed. However, numbers for transition countries in refer to self-employed with employees, i.e. they
operate on a larger scale than that of mere subsistence, making it unlikely that many of them are own-
account workers escaping from unemployment.
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its young population to migration each year since 1998, see Figure 2.1.10 Between 1989
and 2002, net migration to West Germany amounted to 1.3 million people, an equivalent
of 7.5% of the original population of the German Democratic Republic (Heiland [2004]).
And between 1995 and 2007, 19% of East Germans aged 18 to 29 left East for West
Germany. Especially young and skilled East Germans seem to migrate to West Germany
(see e.g. Hunt [2006], Ragnitz [2007] or Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln [2009]).11
Figure 2.1: Migration within Germany of 25-50 year-olds
Gráfico1
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Data: Statistische A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder [2007], excluding Berlin.
Had they stayed in East Germany would these individuals have had set up firms? To
answer this question one would ideally like to consider micro-data for evidence on the
possible interaction of occupational choice and migration. Table 2.2 displays statistics on
East-West migration and self-employment from the unbalanced German Socioeconomic
10Compared to international migration rates, these are large numbers; e.g. current annual net migration
rates from Ecuador and Mexico are 0.8% and 0.4% respectively CIA [2008]. It is very likely that numbers
are upward biased as individuals might be counted more than once, migrating back and forth between
East and West Germany. However, as this only applies to formal changes of residence numbers cited
are not contaminated by the presence of commuters. Between 1990 and 1998, the Czech Republic and
Hungary were net recipients of migration, mainly stemming from other transition countries (United
Nations [2002]), while Poland lost between 0.5% and 3.9% of its original population to migration (United
Nations [2002]).
11Bru¨ckner und Tru¨bswetter [2007] on the other hand do not find that those migrating to West Germany
are more educated than those staying in East Germany. However, they do find a positive self-selection
of migrants according to unobserved individual characteristics.
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Panel (SOEP) for 1992 to 2006. However, the sample is very small: during 14 years only
32 East German self-employed migrated permanently to West Germany, i.e. they did
not move back to East Germany within the considered time frame 1996-2006. Nonethe-
less, these numbers suggest that around 20% fewer East than West Germans became
entrepreneurs. Migration from East to West Germany was 10 times more frequent than
vice versa, slightly higher than suggested by Figure 2.1. Despite a larger West German
population and more self-employed, only one West German self-employed set up a busi-
ness in East Germany for every four East German self-employed who migrated from East
to West Germany.12
Table 2.2: GSOEP Unbalanced Panel Data on Occupation and Migration 1992-2006
West (Sample A) East (Sample C)
Ratios for 18-65 year olds in labor force
(number of observations)
Self-employed 8.8% (765) 7.0% (395)
Migrants to East and West respectively 1.1% (92) 10.5% (597)
Migrants among Self employed 1.0% (8) 8.1% (32)
Migrants: individuals who moved from East to West Germany, and who did not move back within 1996-2006.
How much of the low entrepreneurship rate in East Germany is due to the initial disad-
vantage of a missing tradition vis-a`-vis West Germans? And how much is accounted for
by reunification, i.e. the fact that East Germany integrated into an established economy?
The model economy, presented in the next section, tries to address these questions.
3 Model
There are two regions where individuals reside: East and West Germany. Individuals
differ in managerial knowhow which is a combination of innate talent and entrepreneurial
parental background. After one period (generation), individuals are replaced by a child
of random innate talent. If the parent was an entrepreneur the child inherits information
about how to run a business. East Germans are children of workers. Given their man-
agerial knowhow, individuals decide to become entrepreneurs or workers. Paying a fixed
12Diewald et al. [2006] study life-courses of East Germans after reunification and find that transitions
into self-employment between 1992 and 1996 have been “surprisingly rare”. In particular, they find that
“only 4.1 percent of our sample made this step during the Window of opportunity [1/90-6/92], and 3.8
percent did so in the second period [7/92-3/96]” (pg.73).
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moving cost, a fraction θ of mobile individuals can permanently relocate and work or set
up a business in the other region.13 East and West Germany share goods and capital
markets, but have different labor markets. There is a government that fixes East German
wages as a fraction of West German wages. It also subsidizes the rental rate for capital in
East Germany. Total factor productivity (TFP) in East is lower than in West Germany,
(A∗t < At).
An individual derives utility from personal consumption, ct, and bequests, bt, left to
children
U(ct, bt) = c
ω
t b
1−ω
t , (3.1)
with 0 < ω < 1 reflecting the importance of consumption relative to bequests.
Each individual is endowed with one unit of productive time and a bequest, denoted by
xt. Individuals differ in managerial knowhow (zt), which is made up of innate talent (q)
and parental background (p). Innate talent is independent and identically distributed
across time and individuals in Q = (0, q¯], with cdf F (q) and density f(q).14 Parental
background is equal to one if one’s parent was an entrepreneur and zero otherwise, p ∈
{0, 1}. Managerial knowhow is defined as
zpt = q(1 + φtp),
where φt ≥ 0 indicates the value that being an entrepreneur’s child has for one’s man-
agerial knowhow. An entrepreneurial parent passes on information about how to run a
business, which also includes non-transferable assets such as networks of suppliers, clients,
or relationships with banks.
Every entrepreneur has access to the same technology. He uses his managerial knowhow
(zpt ), workers of efficiency units (nt), and capital (kt) to produce a single output:
yt = F (z
p
t , nt, kt) = At(z
p
t )
1−γ+κ(kνt n
1−ν
t )
γ, (3.2)
13(1−θ) individuals face infinitely high moving cost. I introduce this additional heterogeneity to account
for reasons other than wage differentials or education (here ≈ innate talent) that affect migration decisions
from East to West Germany, e.g. age, family ties (see e.g. Burda [1993]). I abstain from the possibility
of commuting between the two regions. Although this seems to be common among East Germans; see
Hunt [2006], it is a temporary choice for most individuals while in the model occupation and migration
choices are permanent.
14The distribution of innate talent f(q), is identical for East and West Germans. Krueger and Pis-
chke [1995] estimate very similar coefficients for returns to years of schooling for West and East Germans
working in West Germany.
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where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the span-of-control parameter and κ > 0 determines the curvature
of the profit function.15 The capital share of production is νγ ∈ (0, 1). Entrepreneurs
choose optimal amounts of labor and capital in order to maximize their profits net of
income taxes (τ). For any efficiency unit of labor they contribute τut wt to unemployment
insurance.
For a given wage (wt) and rental rate (Rt), the problem of entrepreneurs in West Germany
is
max
{nt,kt}
Πt = (1− τ)[yt − (1 + τut )wtnt −Rtkt − IEηjt ], (3.3)
where IE is an indicator function that takes on value one if the individual is originally
from East Germany. In this case he has to pay a fixed moving cost (ηjt , with j = h, l and
ηht = ∞), deductible from taxes. Higher wages (wt), income taxes (τ), contributions to
unemployment insurance (τut ), rental rates (Rt), and a larger span-of-control parameter
(γ) reduce profits. A higher level of managerial knowhow (zpt ,) and thus also a higher
value of entrepreneurial parental background increase profits.
Entrepreneurs in East Germany face the following profit maximization problem
max
{nt,kt}
Πt = (1−τ)[A∗t (zpt )1−γ+κ(kνt n1−νt )γ−(1−λt)(1+τut )wtnt−(1−χt)Rtkt−IWηjt ]. (3.4)
Higher wage (λt), and rental rate (χt) discounts increase their profits. If originally from
West Germany (IW = 1), they have to pay a moving cost (ηjt ).
Workers supply labor inelastically. Their talent (q) is transformed linearly into efficiency
units of labor. Workers in West Germany earn
(1− τut − τ)wtq − IEηjt . (3.5)
Workers pay income taxes (τ), and mimicking the German unemployment insurance, they
also contribute to the insurance scheme.
Unemployed individuals receive a fraction ς of the wage rate per efficiency unit (vt)
vt = ςwt, (3.6)
15In Lucas [1978] wages are constant in talent and κ is equal to zero. Following Chang [2000], in
the current paper, unemployment benefits are constant, wages are linearly increasing in talent, and thus
profits need to increase more than linearly with talent, which requires setting κ > 0.
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paid independently of an individual’s talent and his region of residence.16 Hence, nobody
opts for migrating to the other region to become unemployed.
Individuals have complete information about the wage setting policy and with a certain
probability ψt, they rationally expect to be involuntarily unemployed when choosing to
stay and work in East Germany. No West German migrates to East Germany to become
a worker, because wages are lower there. Involuntary unemployed East Germans receive
unemployment insurance vt, and hence the expected wage income is
(1− ψt)(1− τut − τ)(1− λt)wtq + ψtvt. (3.7)
Figure 3.2 displays a possible realization of four thresholds of occupational choices for
mobile East Germans. Comparing the wage in West Germany to the expected wage in
East Germany, q˜∗,lt describes the East German individual who is indifferent. The cut-off
qˆ∗,0,lt indicates the East German individual indifferent between working in West or setting
up a business in East Germany. Finally, the threshold qˆ∗˜,0,lt describes the East German
individual indifferent between setting up his business in East or West Germany.17
An individual originally from East Germany receives his bequest (xt) and chooses an opti-
mal occupation, his optimal consumption and bequests in order to maximize Equation 3.1
subject to
ct + bt = xt(1 +Rt − δ) + vtIq<qˆ?t + [(1− ψt)(1− τut − τ)(1− λt)wtq + ψtvt]Iwk +
+ [(1− τut − τ)wtq − ηj]IwkIm + pit(zpt , A∗t ; .)Ient + [pit(zpt , At; .)− ηj]IentIm,
where Iwk,Ient,and Im are indicator functions that take on value one if the individual is
a worker or an entrepreneur and a migrant respectively. The problem for the individual
originally from West Germany is similar but excludes the option to work in East Germany.
Individuals can lend their bequests to firms at the competitive rental rate, Rt. Capital
depreciates at rate δ. First order conditions lead to the following optimal decisions:
ct(z
p
t ; .) = ω[xt(1 +Rt − δ) + Υt(zpt )]
bt(z
p
t ; .) = (1− ω)[xt(1 +Rt − δ) + Υt(zpt )],
16This reflect fairly well benefits policies in Germany before 2005, when they were paid without time
constraints (Arbeitslosenhilfe), and when those who had never worked were eligible for social benefits
(Sozialhilfe). Already in 1992, East German benefits were just 4% below those of West Germany (Bun-
desministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales [2008]).
17For analytical solutions of occupational thresholds, see the Appendix A.3.
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Figure 3.2: Possible thresholds for occupational choices for mobile East Germans.
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l
t
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where Υt(z
p
t ) denotes the labor income from the optimal occupational choice. The indi-
vidual spends a fraction ω of his income on consumption and leaves the rest to his child.
The solution to the individual’s problem also includes the optimal occupational choice.
Each period the economy’s aggregate capital stock (Xt) is determined by the sum of all
bequests from last period 18
Xt = L
0
t−1
∫ z¯0
0
bt−1(z0t−1; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t−1
∫ z¯1t−1
0
bt−1(z1t−1; .)f(q)dq +
+ L0∗t−1
∫ z¯0
0
b∗t−1(z
0∗
t−1; .)f(q)dq + L
1∗
t−1
∫ z¯1t−1
0
b∗t−1(z
1∗
t−1; .)f(q)dq, (3.8)
The growth rate of TFP is
gt =
At − At−1
At−1
.
18Individuals during the last period were either children of workers L0t−1 or children of entrepreneurs
L1t−1. Given perfect capital markets and the warm glow motive for bequests, there is no need to follow
the joint distribution of wealth and managerial knowhow in this economy.
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Following Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2000], this growth rate is a positive function of
the innate talent of last period’s entrepreneurs, relative to population size (after migration
decisions have been made). For West Germany:
gt = h( ¯Qt−1/Pt),
where
Q¯t−1 = L0t−1
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t−1
qf(q)dq + L1t−1
∫ z¯1t−1
zˆ1t−1
qf(q)dq,
with h increasing in Q¯t−1. Similarly for East Germany: g∗t+1 = h(Q¯
∗
t−1/P
∗
t ).
19 The innate
talent of last period’s entrepreneurs is the sum of the innate talent of entrepreneurs who
are children of workers (or unemployed) L0t−1 and those who are children of entrepreneurs
L1t−1. For a given share of entrepreneurs in the economy, growth is maximized when all in-
dividuals whose talent is above a certain threshold decide to start a business, irrespective
of their parental background. However, if parental background is valuable, the marginal
entrepreneur with an entrepreneurial family background will be of lower innate talent. In
this case, an individual’s occupational choice exerts a negative externality on the econ-
omy’s growth rate.
The value of parental background, φt+1, on the other hand, is defined as a decreasing
function of TFP growth
φt+1 = a(gt), (3.9)
with a(gt) ≥ 0 and ∂a(gt)∂gt < 0. Fast technological change makes today very different
from yesterday, reducing the value of private information inherited from parents. In the
limit, past information about how to run a business becomes completely worthless, and
everyone’s managerial knowhow is solely defined by their innate talent
lim
gt→∞
a(gt) = 0.
The government collects income taxes from entrepreneurs and workers and it fixes the
discounts on East German wages (λt) and rental rates (χt). Tax revenues finance the
19Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2000] reason the positive relationship between entrepreneurs’ innate
talent and TFP growth as follows: ‘the higher the individual entrepreneur’s ability to learn or under-
stand or to deal with new or trying situations, the larger will the individual’s technological innovations
be. This will create a feedback mechanism whereby rapid technology growth creates an environment
in which the sorting of individuals to entrepreneurial positions is based on intelligence, not on social
background.”(pg.889).
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difference in the rental rate to lenders, but the government cannot run a deficit.20 Each
period, contributions to social security have to finance unemployment benefits. Let Kd,∗t
denote aggregate capital demand in East Germany, Wt denotes aggregate gross wages of
the economy, Πt are aggregate before-tax profits, and UBt are aggregate unemployment
benefits. Each period the government has to fulfill the following two constraints
Gt + χtRtK
d,∗
t = τ(Πt +Wt) (3.10)
with Gt ≥ 0 ∨t, and
UBt = 2τ
u
t Wt. (3.11)
East German wages are fixed above labor productivity and hence equilibria after re-
unification are characterized by involuntary unemployment in East Germany.21 For an
equilibrium there needs to be market clearing in the common markets for goods and cap-
ital, and in the West German labor market. The East German labor market has to be
in positive net supply. Denote aggregate labor demand in East and West Germany by
Nd,∗t and N
d
t respectively. N
s,∗
t and N
s
t are aggregate labor supplies. Aggregate capital
demand in West Germany is denoted by Kdt . Let Y
s,∗
t and Y
s
t be aggregate supplies of
goods. Capital supply after reunification, Xt is given by the sum of the capital stocks of
West and East Germany. For the capital market to clear we require
Xt = Kt = K
d,∗
t +K
d
t . (3.12)
For the goods market to clear the following has to hold
Y s,∗t + Y
s
t = ω{Πt +Wt + UBt + (1 +Rt − δ)Xt}+ (1− ω){Πt +Wt +
+ UBt + (1 +Rt − δ)Xt}+Gt + χtRtKd,∗t + Ξt − (1− δ)Xt. (3.13)
Consumption, bequests, government consumption, and moving costs (Ξt) have to equal
the sum of production and the depreciated aggregate capital stock. The labor market in
West Germany has to clear:
N st = N
d
t . (3.14)
I require the labor market in East Germany to be in positive net supply
N s,∗t ≥ Nd,∗t . (3.15)
20This restriction is never binding in the calibrated version of the model; i.e. investment aids never
exceed tax revenues.
21Involuntary unemployment is assigned randomly. Entrepreneurs hire ’efficiency units’ and are indif-
ferent between hiring few very capable or more less capable workers.
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When the difference between supply and demand in the East German labor market is pos-
itive, there is involuntary unemployment.22 In equilibrium, the probability of involuntary
unemployment expected by East Germans (ψt) has to equal the realized rate
ψt =
N s,∗t −Nd,∗t
P ∗t+1
. (3.16)
Given an initial aggregate capital stock X0, an initial fraction of entrepreneurs L
1
0 in West
Germany, and their talent Q−1, a government policy, {τ, ς, λt, χt}, moving costs {ηjt , η∗,jt }
for j ∈ {h, l} and prices for labor and capital as well as a probability of involuntary
unemployment in East Germany {wt, Rt, ψt}, an equilibrium is a collection
{ct(zpt , ηjt ; .), ct(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), bt(zpt , ηjt ; .), bt(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), qˆ?t , q?t , q˜tj, qˆpt , qˆjt , ˜ˆqjt , ˆ˜qpt , τut , Gt} for p ∈ {0, 1}
and j ∈ {h, l} such that:
1. {ct(zpt , ηjt ; .), bt(zpt , ηjt ; .), q?t , qˆpt , ˆ˜qp,jt } solves the individual’s problem for West Ger-
mans of types p ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {h, l};
2. {ct(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), bt(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), q˜tj, qˆp,jt , ˜ˆqp,jt } solves the individual’s problem for East Ger-
mans of types p ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {h, l} who are not unemployed;
3. {ct(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), bt(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), qˆ?t } solves the individual’s problem for East Germans of
types p ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {h, l} who are unemployed;
4. the rate of involuntary unemployment coincides with East Germans’ expectations
(i.e. equation 3.16 holds);
5. markets for goods and capital and the West German labor market clear (i.e. equa-
tions 3.12-3.14 hold);
6. the East German labor market is in positive net supply or inactive (i.e. equation 3.15
holds);
7. (τut ) is such that unemployment insurance is self-financing (i.e. equation 3.11 holds);
8. the government’s budget is balanced (i.e. equation 3.10 holds with Gt ≥ 0).
Lemma 3.1. There exists no equilibrium after reunification in which both, West and East
German individuals become entrepreneurs in both, East and West Germany.
Either East Germans set up businesses in East and West Germany or West Germans set
up businesses in East and West Germany (see the Appendix A.2 for a proof).
22Migration and occupational choices are only altered until expected involuntary unemployment is
equal to the realized rate. An individual who finds himself involuntarily unemployed cannot reconsider
his choice.
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4 Calibration
To assign values to parameters for innate talent, preferences, technology, and those gov-
erning the role of parental background and the link between entrepreneurship and growth,
I consider the balanced growth path of a model economy with one region; i.e. West Ger-
many prior to 1989.23 Other parameters are assigned considering data for Germany after
reunification.
The following parameters are fixed based on available evidence. For the mean log-talent
(µ) and its dispersion (σ), I use values of 2.11 and 0.58 respectively as estimated by
Chang [2000] for the US wage distribution of non-supervisory workers.24 The span-of-
control parameter (γ) is set to 0.865, the midpoint of values estimated by Burnside et
al [1995]. The average over 1970-1989 for the ratio of depreciation of fixed private capital
over gross private capital stock gives me an annual depreciation rate (δ) of 4.6% (Statis-
tisches Bundesamt [2006]). In 1991, wages in East Germany were set to 50% of West
German wages, by 1995, they were at 70% and by 2007 they had reached about 80% of
West German wages, see Sinn [2002]. I use the intermediate value and set λt to 0.3.
25
In 1989, the population of the German Democratic Republic was equal to one fourth of
the West German population, see Statistische Bundesamt [2006]. The per capita capital
stock of East Germany in 1991 was around 43% the one of West Germany, see Statistische
Bundesamt [2006] and [2011]. Table 4.3 displays all parameter values.
Two central functions of the model are: i)the relationship between entrepreneurs’ innate
talent and TFP growth and ii)the relationship between TFP growth and the value of
entrepreneurial parental background. The first function is specified as follows:
gt = h(Q¯t−1) =
1
(1 + e−Q¯t−1)1/α
,
with α ≥ 0 for a positive relationship. I choose α equal to 0.22 to match an average
GDP per capita growth rate of 2.26% for West Germany between 1970-1989 (Statistisches
23For a description of this economy, see Appendix A.4. Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln [2007] find that
it takes two generations for East German preferences to converge to those of West Germans. Assuming
a different value for the preference parameter ω, for East Germans does not have a direct effect on their
occupational choices.
24The German labor market is characterized by more regulation and lower labor force participation
rate of low-skilled individuals, making the use of parameters from a West German wage distribution for
a distribution of talents less adequate.
25Even though by 2007 around 30% of firms in East Germany had opted out of collective agreements
(IAB Betriebspanel [2008]), on average East German labor costs per hour in 2008 were only 27.9% lower
compared to West German labor costs (Statistisches Bundesamt [2011]).
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Table 4.3: Parameters
Parameters fixed Source Value
West Germany prior 1989
Mean log talent (µ) Chang (2000) 2.110
Dispersion in log talent (σ) Chang(2000) 0.580
Span-of-control (γ) Burnside et al(1995) 0.865
Annual depreciation rate (δ) Stat. Bundesamt(2006) 0.046
Reunification
Discount on East German wages (λt) Sinn(2002) 0.300
Ratio of East to West German population Stat. Bundesamt (2006) 0.250
Ratio of east to West German capital stock Stat. Bundesamt(2006) 0.430
Parameters calibrated Target
West Germany prior 1989
Relating entrepreneurs’ talent to growth (α) GDP growth 0.220
Relating growth to Value of parental background (σ¯) Intergenerational mobility 0.957
Importance of Capital (ν) Capital share 0.347
Weight of consumption in utility (ω) Capital-output ratio 0.803
Unemployment Benefit (ς) Unemployment rate 2.649
Curvature of profit function (κ) Business ownership rate 0.101
Income tax (τ) Tax revenues to GDP 0.175
Reunification
Ratio of East to West German TFP Relative labor productivities 0.745
Discount on East German rental rate Financial aids to GDP 0.201
Fraction of mobile Germans (θ) Migraton of East Germans 0.500
Moving costs for mobile Germans (ηlt) Unemployment East 0.42
Yt−1
Pt−1
Bundesamt [2006]). The function a(gt) is specified as
φt+1 = a(gt) =
φ¯
1 + gt
,
where the parameter φ¯ is assigned a value of 0.957 to match that 60% of West German
entrepreneurs have an entrepreneurial parent (Pistrui et al [2000]).26
The importance of capital (ν) is calibrated to a value of 0.3468 in order to target a capital
share of 0.3 as reported by the Deutsche Bundesbank [2001] for West Germany for 1970
to 1989. I choose a value of 0.8035 for the relative importance of consumption in utility
(ω) to match an average capital-output ratio of 2.32 for West Germany for 1970-1989
(Statistisches Bundesamt [2006]). The unemployment benefit as a fraction of the wage
26Zero correlation of talent between parents and children requires assigning a relatively high value to
φ¯ in order to be able to account for the persistence in occupations. For a discussion of occupational
mobility in West Germany see the Appendix A.5.
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Table 4.4: Calibration targets and model values
Targeted moments Source Data Model
West Germany prior 1989
Annual growth rate of GDP (1971-89) Stat. Bundesamt(2006) 0.0226 0.0226
Entrepreneurs with entrepreneurial parent (1997) Pistrui et al(2000) 0.6000 0.6002
Capital share (1970-89) Bundesbank(2001) 0.3000 0.3000
Capital-output ratio (1970-89) Stat. Bundesamt(2006) 2.3200 2.3231
Unemployment rate (1970-89) BfA(2007) 0.0540 0.0540
Business ownership rate (1972-89) Compendia(2002) 0.0690 0.0692
Tax revenues to GDP (1975-1990) OECD(2006) 0.1220 0.1216
Reunification
East to West German labor productivity Stat. Bundesamt(2006) 0.6800 0.6659
Investment aid to West German GDP Wurzel(2001) 0.0100 0.0088
East-West net migration Heiland(2004) 0.0750 0.0780
East German unemployment Sachverst.(2007) 0.2700 0.2701
Not targeted moments
West Germany prior 1989
Annual rate of capital (1970-89) UN Stats(2010) 0.0520 0.0659
Average firm size, workers (1972-89) Compendia(2002) 11.0000 12.6675
Unemployment benefit to mean wage (1991) BM Arbeit und Soziales(2008) 0.2900 0.2830
Contribution to unemployment insurance (1970-89) Glismann and Schrader(2002) 0.0145 0.0087
Reunification
Output per capita East to West Stat. Aemter(2011) 0.6000 0.5156
Unemployment rate BfA(2007) 0.0980 0.0943
Average firm size East to West Stat. Bundesamt(2008) 1.0400 1.0409
Unemployment benefits paid in East BfA(2006) 0.3540 0.5279
rate per efficiency unit (ς) is calibrated to 2.649 to target an average unemployment rate
of 5.4% for West Germany between 1970 and 1989 (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit [2007]).27
The curvature of the profit function (κ) is assigned a value of 0.101 to match a business
ownership rate of 6.9% for West Germany for 1972 to 1989, see Entrepreneurs Interna-
tional (Compendia [2002]).28 The income tax rate (τ) is calibrated to 0.175 to match a
ratio of taxes on income and profits as percentage of GDP of 12.2% for West Germany
for 1975 to 1990 (OECD [2006]).
27I use the official unemployment rate because unofficial unemployment rates that include the “hidden
unemployed”, (i.e. individuals who do not appear as officially unemployed due to some form of active
labor market policy (training programs, wage subsidies, early retirement schemes) but whose income
comes to a large extent in form of subsidies) are not available for years prior to 1993 because active labor
market schemes have mostly been in place since 1990.
28Data is available from 1972 onwards.
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The remaining parameters are calibrated to the model economy with two regions. I set
the initial ratio of East to West German TFP to 0.7451 to match an average ratio of East
to West German labor productivity measured as GDP per employed person of 68%. This
measure rose from 35% in 1991 to 78% in 2007 (Statistisches Bundesamt [2006]). The
discount on the rental rate of capital in East Germany χt, is calibrated to a value of 0.201
to match a ratio of investment-aid to West German GDP of 1%, see Wurzel [2001].29 The
fraction of mobile individuals θ, is assigned a value of 0.5 to a net migration rate of 7.5%,
see Heiland [2004]. I set moving costs for mobile Germans ηlt, to a value of 42% of West
German per capita GDP of a pre-reunification generation in the model in order to match
an unemployment rate of 27%.30
The model for West Germany is also able to generate un-targeted statistics in line with
data. The rental rate of capital in the model is 6.6%, somewhat higher than the deflated
average of German government long-term bond yields over 1970-1989 of 5.2% (IMF and
Heston et al. [2011] and United Nations Statistics Division [2010]). Average firm size is
12.7 workers per firm, which is slightly higher than the 11 workers per West German firm
in Entrepreneurs International (Compendia [2002]) for 1972-1989. The ratio of unemploy-
ment benefits to mean nominal wage in the model is 28.3% and thus comes very close to
the ratio of monthly social subsidies to the monthly nominal average equivalent income
of 29% for West Germany for 1991(Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales [2008]and
DIW [1995]).31 Contributions to unemployment insurance with employers and employees
each paying 0.87% of gross wages are somewhat lower in the model than in the data.
According to Glismann and Schrader [2002] contributions to unemployment insurance
by each employer and employee in West Germany between 1970 and 1989 were equal to
1.45% of gross income.
Table 4.4 also presents un-targeted statistics for the two region model. The per capita
29Between 1991 and 1995 annual public transfers for support to enterprises and business-near infras-
tructure were in the range of 0.63% and 0.99% of West German GDP. These do not include special
depreciation allowances, debt servicing expenditure and credits. The estimated value of χt = 0.201 is
somewhat in line with Ragnitz [2002] who finds that in 2000 most firms in East Germany still received
investment aids of around one quarter of their investment costs.
30The Sachversta¨ndigenrat [2007] publishes numbers of registered and hidden unemployed. Between
1993 and 2003, the number of hidden unemployed in East Germany was on average equal to 55% of
registered unemployed; with an average official East German unemployment rate for 1991 to 2007 of
17.5% (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit [2008]) this adds up to a rate of 27%. Moving costs for East Germans
η∗,jt are assumed to be equal to moving costs for West Germans. Immobile Germans face infinitely high
moving costs, ηht =∞.
31According to a letter from the Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales, equivalent data for the
time period 1970 to 1989 is not available.
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GDP ratio for East to West Germany of 52% is eight percentage points lower than the
average ratio of 60% for 1991 to 2008 in the data (Statistische A¨mter der La¨nder [2011]).
Entrepreneurs in East Germany hire on average 0.6 workers more than entrepreneurs
in West Germany. This is in line with data on slightly larger East German firms, see
Statistische Bundesamt [2008]. Aggregate unemployment in the model is 9.8%, equal to
the average unemployment rate between 1992 and 2007 (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit [2007])
Data by the Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit [2006] show a cross subsidizing of unemployment
benefits between East and West Germany, but to a somewhat lesser extent than in the
model.
5 Results
Due to the missing tradition of entrepreneurship, East Germans’ managerial knowhow
is lower than that of West Germans. Wages are fixed above labor productivity and free
migration to West Germany implies an attractive outside option for East Germans. As
a result, in East Germany few individuals become entrepreneurs, production is low and
unemployment is high. I perform two counter factual experiments to quantify the effects
of the missing tradition of entrepreneurship and of the German reunification on economic
outcomes. The first experiment assumes that between 1949 and 1989 East Germany had
maintained an entrepreneurial tradition, i.e. there is an equally sized fraction of individ-
uals with entrepreneurial parents in East and West Germany. The second experiment
tests what would have happened if in 1990, East Germany had remained an independent
country, i.e. migration would have been restricted, wages would have adjusted to clear the
East German labor market and there would have been no subsidies. Table 5.5 displays
results of these two experiments next to the ones from the benchmark model.32
With a similar tradition in entrepreneurship as in West Germany, managerial knowhow
in East and West Germany would have been the same. Hence, around 37% more individ-
uals would have set up their own business in East Germany. They would have produced
and created jobs. GDP per capita would have been around 16% higher. Unemployment
would have been reduced by almost 10 percentage points, and involuntary unemployment
eliminated. Hence, the missing tradition of entrepreneurship can account for almost 10
percentage points of the gap in GDP per capita between East and West Germany. Around
35% of unemployment can be explained by this mechanism. Improved job opportunities
imply that fewer East Germans would have migrated to West Germany. Without the ini-
tial disadvantage in terms of managerial knowhow, relatively more East Germans would
32For results on West Germany’s and aggregate economic outcomes see Table A2 of Appendix.
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Table 5.5: Results
entrepreneurial independent
benchmark tradition East
economy in East Germany
Entrepreneurs in East 0.0524 0.0720 0.0539
TFP growth East 0.0141 0.0134 0.0166
GDP per capita East 100.0000 116.6294 113.2342
GDP per capita East-West 0.5156 0.6111 0.5891
Unemployment East 0.2701 0.1755 0.2033
of those involuntary 0.0915 0.0000 0.0000
Migration to West 0.0780 0.0567 0.0000
of those workers 0.8022 0.6244 -
of those entrepreneurs 0.1978 0.3756 -
Wage East to West 0.6659 0.7106 0.6941
Unemployment insurance 0.0173 0.0140 0.0150
To maintain aggregate managerial knowhow at the benchmark level, I adjust µ to 2.10071 for the first experiment. Note that in this case
average innate intelligence is lower - leading to reduced TFP growth. Maintaining individuals’ decisions but using the distribution of innate
intelligence from the benchmark model with µ = 2.11 leads to a slightly higher TFP growth rate of 1.36%. To obtain equilibrium, the discount
on wages λt has to be adjusted to 0.2971.
have set up a business in West Germany. Therefore, the missing tradition can account for
around 27% of migration. The relative average East German wage would have increased
and together with reduced unemployment this would have allowed for lower contributions
to unemployment insurance. On the other hand, entrepreneurial parental background in
East Germany would have induced individuals of lower innate talent to set up their own
business and thus TFP growth would have been lower.
If instead East Germany had remained an independent country, similar to other transition
countries, TFP growth would have been 18% higher than the benchmark case. However,
given the missing tradition, entrepreneurship would have increased only slightly by 3%.
GDP per capita would have been around 13% higher and unemployment 7 percentage
points lower. Given very different starting points in 1990, these numbers can only be
compared tentatively to those for other transition countries. For instance, similar to the
results of this experiment, between 1991 and 2009 GDP per capita growth in Poland
was on average 24% higher than in East Germany (with Berlin - see Figure A-1). En-
trepreneurship in other transition countries, on the other hand, was at least 15% higher
than in East Germany, see Table 2.1. According to OECD statistics, between 1990 and
2012, average unemployment in Poland was 13%, higher than in West Germany but lower
than in East Germany. According to Eurostat, between 2000 and 2010 all transition
countries improved their relative GDP per capita with respect to that of the EU-27 by
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at least 10 percentage points, while relative GDP per capita in all East German states
stagnated.
The effects of this last experiment can be decomposed by considering the three experi-
ments that make up the scenario of an independent East Germany: (1) restricting mi-
gration (2) eliminating subsidies (3) allowing for flexible wages. Table 5.6 displays these
decomposition results next to the ones for an independent East Germany.33
Table 5.6: Decomposition of results
independent
East no no flexible
Germany migration subsidies wages
Entrepreneurs in East 0.0539 0.0553 0.0315 0.0566
TFP growth East 0.0166 0.0170 0.0108 0.0157
GDP per capita East 113.2342 125.5497 45.9840 115.1758
GDP per capita East-West 0.5891 0.6659 0.2299 0.5986
Unemployment East 0.2033 0.1595 0.6591 0.1743
of those involuntary 0.0000 0.0000 0.4542 0.0000
Migration to West 0.0000 0.0000 0.1669 0.0453
of those workers - - 0.8852 0.7756
of those entrepreneurs - - 0.1148 0.2244
Wage East to West 0.6941 0.7426 0.6470 0.6818
Unemployment insurance 0.0150 0.0139 0.0280 0.0130
To obtain equilibria in the second experiment (no migration), the discount on wages λt has to be adjusted to 0.294.
These experiments reveal that migration to West Germany together with the wage set-
ting policy account for most of the negative effects of reunification on economic outcomes
in East Germany. Contrary to conventional wisdom, flexible wages would have reduced
migration because the threat of involuntary unemployment would have disappeared. Ex-
pected wages for those staying in East Germany would have increased. Based on the
calibration of the model, around 545,000 fewer East Germans would have migrated to
work or set up a business in West Germany. Migration drew in the most talented indi-
viduals that otherwise would have contributed to East German TFP growth.
Subsidies to the rental rate of capital on the other hand, induced individuals to set up their
33Additional results for economic outcomes of West Germany and the aggregate are displayed in Ta-
ble A3 of the Appendix.
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own business, create jobs, and produce. Without subsidies, almost 40% fewer individuals
would have set up a business in East Germany. Relative GDP per capita East to West
would have been around 23% - lower than the ratio of 33% in 1991 (Statistische A¨mter
der La¨nder [2014]). More than half of the East German population would have been
unemployed. Out of fear for involuntary unemployment, migration would have doubled.
However, the positive effects of flexible wages and migration restrictions on East German
economic outcomes overall dominate. These results suggest that – given the missing tradi-
tion in entrepreneurship – the optimal policy for East German economic outcomes would
have been an independent East Germany with flexible wages and important subsidies to
capital.
6 Conclusion
East Germany’s post-1989 experience has been different from that of other transition
countries. It was integrated into an established economy and received a ready-made regu-
latory framework and massive financial aids. However, East German economic outcomes
have been lower than expected. There are significantly fewer entrepreneurs and economic
growth is lower compared to other transition economies. This paper tests how much
low entrepreneurship and its impact on economic outcomes can be accounted for by the
missing tradition and how much is due to features of reunification - free migration to
West Germany, fixed wages and capital subsidies. The missing tradition in entrepreneur-
ship implied an initial disadvantage for East Germans in terms of managerial knowhow.
Results suggest that this disadvantage can account for almost 10 percentage points in
unemployment and in the output gap between East and West German GDP per capita.
Results from an alternative counter factual experiment suggest that two key features of
reunification hindered East Germany’s economic take-off: migration possibilities to West
Germany and fixed wages. Subsidies, on the other hand, strongly dampened the negative
effects of the former.
Twenty years after reunification, a productivity gap between East and West Germany
remained. As a solution, many firms in East Germany had opted out from collectively
bargained wages. However, as of January 2015, all German firms will have to pay a
universal minimum wage of 8.50 Euros per hour. Recently, employer representatives in
the hospitality sector in East Germany have tried to negotiate lower wages. But again
arguments of fairness were employed to defend a universal minimum wage across German
regions. This paper suggest that it is important to take into account general equilibrium
effects on entrepreneurship and migration is important. Against commonly held beliefs,
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a slightly lower East German wage could be more favorable to East German economic
outcomes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure A-1: Growth Rates of Real GDP per Capita
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Figure A-2: Sensitivity Analysis for α and φ¯−Growth Rate (g)
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Figure A-3: Sensitivity Analysis for α and φ¯ - Ratio of Likelihoods
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
The threshold of managerial knowhow that determines who is indifferent between setting
up a business in East or West Germany only exists for West German individuals if (1 −
λt)
(1−ν)γ(1 − χt)νγ < A
∗
t
At
1−γ
and for East Germans this threshold only exists if (1 −
λt)
(1−ν)γ(1− χt)νγ > A
∗
t
At
1−γ
. These conditions are mutually exclusive.
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A.3 Thresholds of Occupational Choices
The cut-off value, q˜t
j, describes the East German individual who is indifferent between
working in East or West Germany
q˜t
j =
ψtςwt + η
∗,j
t
(1− τut − τ)(ψt + λt − ψtλt)wt
.
Comparing their potential wage in West Germany to the profits they can make as en-
trepreneurs, East Germans set up their own business in East Germany whenever,
pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t ; .) ≥ (1− τut − τ)wtq − η∗,jt .
Note that the profit function for entrepreneurs in East Germany and the function for
wage income in West Germany might cross twice. Initially being an entrepreneur in East
Germany is always better than working in West Germany, due to fixed moving costs.
With increasing talent, wage income increases and individuals are able to pay the fixed
costs and thus might prefer to work in West Germany instead of setting up a business in
East Germany. Given increasing returns to knowhow there might exist a second threshold
where setting up a business in East Germany becomes again more attractive as opposed
to working in West Germany.
The cut-off value, ˜ˆqp,jt describes the East German individual who is indifferent between
setting up his business in East or West Germany
˜ˆqp,jt = z˜t
∗,p,j =
η∗jt (wt(1 + τut )) (1−ν)γ1−γ R νγ1−γt Ψ−1t
(
1− A
∗
t
At(1− λt)
(1−ν)γ
1−γ (1− χt)
νγ
1−γ
)−1
1−γ
1−γ+κ
,
where Ψt = A
1
1−γ
t (1− γ)(γ(1− ν))
γ
(1−γ) ( ν
1−ν )
νγ
1−γ . This threshold of occupational choice is
independent of the individual’s parental background, ˜ˆqp,jt = z˜t
∗,p,j = z˜t∗,j. It is positive
only if (1− λt)(1−ν)γ(1−χt)νγ > A
∗
t
At
1−γ
. The cut-off value qˆ∗t , describing the East German
individual who is indifferent between working in East Germany or being unemployed is
given by
qˆ∗t =
ς
(1− τut − τ)(1− λt)
.
The marginal worker from West Germany, q?t is indifferent between working or being
unemployed q?t =
ς
(1−τut −τ) . Note that some of the comparisons among all occupations
that individuals make in order to make their optimal choice are omitted in Figure 3.2.
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The cut-off value of innate talent (qˆpt ) that describes the West German individual who is
indifferent between working or setting up a business is given by
qˆpt =
(
(1 + φtp)
−(1+γ+κ)
1−γ w
1−νγ
1−γ
t R
νγ
1−γ
t Ψ
−1
t (1− τ)−1(1 + τut )
γ−νγ
1−γ (1− τut − τ)
) 1−γ
κ
.
This threshold decreases in the value of entrepreneurial parental background. When
TFP grows fast, the value of entrepreneurial parental background vanishes (φt → 0) and
the difference in talent between the two marginal entrepreneurs from different family
backgrounds disappears. Whenever pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .) ≥ (1 − τut − τ)wtq, West Germans
decide to set up a business in East Germany instead of working in West Germany. How-
ever, the threshold resulting from this choice is only relevant whenever the marginal
entrepreneur who sets up his business in East Germany exists and has less knowhow than
the marginal entrepreneur in West Germany. Individuals in West Germany also compare
unemployment benefits to profits from setting up a business in East Germany. Whenever
pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .) ≥ vt, they decide to set up a business in East Germany instead of being
unemployed. Only if the marginal entrepreneur who sets up his business in East Germany
exists and has less knowhow than the marginal entrepreneur in West Germany and also
less knowhow than the marginal worker does this choice become relevant.
A.4 Model - West Germany before reunification
In the model economy with one region - West Germany - individuals have no migration
choices and they decide among three occupations: unemployed, worker, or entrepreneur.
Figure A-4 displays the resulting thresholds of occupational choice for individuals from
an entrepreneurial family background and for those from a working family background.
Individuals with a lower talent than q?t stay unemployed while those with talent between
q?t and qˆ
1
t become workers. Individuals with a higher talent than qˆ
1
t and parental back-
ground in entrepreneurship set up a business. Those of equal talent but without parental
background in entrepreneurship become workers. Everyone with a higher talent than qˆ0t
becomes an entrepreneur. Tax revenues are used for pure government consumption only,
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Figure A-4: Thresholds of Occupational Choice - West Germany prior to 1989
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and each period the government has to fulfill the following two constraints
Gt = τ{L1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
(yt − wt(1 + τut )nt −Rtkt)f(q)dq +
+ L0t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
(yt − wt(1 + τut )nt −Rtkt)f(q)dq +
+ L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
wtqf(q)dq + L
0
t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
wtqf(q)dq}, (A-1)
and
vt
∫ qˆt
0
f(q)dq = 2τut wt
(
L0t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
qf(q)dq + L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
qf(q)dq
)
. (A-2)
In equilibrium all three markets for goods, capital, and labor must clear. Denote by
nt(z
p
t ; .) and kt(z
p
t ; .) optimal demands for labor and capital services by an entrepreneur
born in period t with managerial knowhow zpt . For the labor market to clear aggregate
labor demand has to be equal to aggregate labor supply
Ndt = L
0
t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
nt(z
0
t ; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
nt(z
1
t ; .)f(q)dq, (A-3)
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N st = L
0
t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
qf(q)dq + L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
qf(q)dq.
For the capital market to clear aggregate capital demand has to equal aggregate capital
supply
Kdt = L
0
t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
kt(z
0
t ; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
kt(z
1
t ; .)f(q)dq = Xt. (A-4)
With yt(z
p
t ; .) being the supply of goods by any entrepreneur of knowhow z
p
t , for market
clearing in the goods market consumption, bequests, and government consumption have
to equal the sum of production and the depreciated capital stock
L0t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
yt(z
0
t ; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
yt(z
1
t ; .)f(q)dq =
= L0t
∫ z¯0
0
(ct(z
0
t ; .) + bt(z
0
t ; .))f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
0
(ct(z
1
t ; .) + bt(z
1
t ; .))f(q)dq −
−Xt(1− δ) +Gt. (A-5)
Equilibrium Given an initial capital stock, X0, an initial fraction of entrepreneurs L
1
0,
and their talent, Q¯−1, a government policy, {τ, ς}, and a sequence of prices for labor and
capital {wt, Rt}∞0 , a competitive equilibrium is a collection {ct(zpt ; .), bt(zpt ; .), q?t , qˆpt , τut , Gt}∞0
for p ∈ {0, 1} such that:
1. {ct(zpt ; .), bt(zpt ; .), zˆpt , qˆt}∞0 solves the individual’s problem for each p ∈ {0, 1} and for
each t;
2. all three markets, for goods, capital, and labor clear, i.e. equations (A-3)-(A-5) hold
for all t;
3. {(τut }∞0 is such that the unemployment insurance is self-financing, equation A-2
holds for all t;
4. {Gt}∞0 is such that equation A-1 holds for all t.
A.5 Discussion- Intergenerational Persistence of Occupations
How many entrepreneurs come from an entrepreneurial family background? Looking at
West German data for 1970 and 1980, Arum and Mu¨ller [2004] find that 14.7% of all self-
employed had a self-employed father. Lohmann and Luber [2004] report that between
1984 and 1988, 36% of West German males with a self-employment family background
became self-employed. On the other end of the scale, Klein [2000] finds that only 39% of
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all German family firms are in their founder generations, rising the likelihood of being an
entrepreneur if one’s parents were so to 61%. Similarly, Pistrui et al [2000] find that 60%
of West German entrepreneurs have a parent who had been an entrepreneur. According
to Mueller [2006] German employees whose parents have been self-employed are about
1.5 times as likely to start a business as others. Geißler [2006] differentiates between
social mobility of entrepreneurs with more than 10 employees and those operating on
smaller scales. He estimates that 50% of the former and 19% of the latter had parents
who were entrepreneurs. Within the framework of the model, one can consider alternative
interpretations of occupational inheritance. The most wealthy individuals who consume
more and leave more bequests to their children are entrepreneurs and one can distin-
guish between three economic ’classes’ in the model: the unemployed, the working class,
and the entrepreneurial class. The question of ’how many entrepreneurs come from an
entrepreneurial family background?’ can thus be turned into a question of 1)class mobil-
ity and/or 2)wealth persistence and/or 3)earnings mobility. West Germany is generally
found to be a society of relatively little class mobility. Erikson and Goldthorpe [1993]
conclude that in West Germany “quite contrary to a [...] ’semi-classless’ form of society
and a ’land of fluidity’ [...] historically formed influences on class-mobility chances have
largely retained their power” (p.151) Mu¨ller and Pollak [2004] consider class mobility in
West Germany and find that for the periods 1976-80, 1982-90, and 1991-99, 64%, 63%,
and 63% of large employers, and higher and lower grade professionals with higher techni-
cal, administrative and managerial occupations remained within their class. Furthermore,
the authors conclude that “we cannot find any major changes in (absolute) mobility ex-
periences in the last quarter of the twentieth century.” (pg.91) “Germany continues to
have strong inheritance effects [...] as well as particularly marked distinctions between
a manual and non-manual space of social mobility.”(pg.110) “In sum [...] in Germany a
large part of the effects of origin class on class destination is mediated through education.
In particular the hierarchical component in class-mobility results from class inequalities
in educational participation and education-based class allocation.”(pg.106) This obser-
vation combined with recent data by the OECD [2007b] showing that “students from a
blue-collar background are about one-half as likely to be in higher education as compared
with what their proportion in the population would suggest.”(pg.116) indicate little class
mobility in West Germany. Comparing social mobility among European countries, Breen
and Luijkx [2004] conclude that “Germany, France, Italy, and Ireland seem to be the least
fluent countries [...] [in]-notably Germany- there is no statistically significant change[...]
towards a weaker association between origins and destinations.” (pg 73). Estimates of
wealth persistence by Morck et al. [1998] show rather limited intergenerational mobil-
ity in West Germany, whereas Solon [2002] cites estimates of intergenerational earnings
elasticity describing Germany as a country of relatively high earnings mobility. However,
as Goldberger [1989] points out: “Naturally enough the sociologists’ models incorporate
outcomes other than income or earnings. Now suppose that intergenerational links are
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stronger for occupation or socioeconomic status than for income or earnings. Then re-
stricting attention to the monetary measures could lead an economist to understate the
influence of family background on inequality.”(pg.513). Estimates on class mobility pro-
vide the most widely encompassing concept of the dependence of one’s status on family
background. In the model class mobility and occupational mobility coincide and thus
given that Pistrui et al [2000]’s and Mu¨ller and Pollak [2004]’s estimates are very similar
I am confident using the former as a target for calibration.
A.6 Tables
Table A1: Enterprises per 1000 labor force participants; employees
West Germany East Germany Czech Republic Poland Hungary
Year (incl. firms with zero employment)
2002 68;75 60;67 174;187 89;111 136;145
2003 68;76 62;69 174;189 88;109 134;143
2004 73;82 70;78 147;190 87;108 137;146
2005 73;83 72;82 167;182 83;102 133;144
2006 74;83 72;82 167;180 87;101 129;139
2007 75;84 73;83 172;182 89;99 130;141
Data: Eurostat [2005] (NACE: C-I;K), Statistisches Bundesamt [2008] (for Germany)
Table A2: Additional Results
entrepreneurial independent
tradition East
Benchmark in East Germany
Entrepreneurs in West 0.0666 0.0637 0.0699
TFP growth West 0.0165 0.0160 0.0159
GDP per capita West 100.0000 98.4066 99.1013
Unemployment West 0.0546 0.0560 0.0551
Entrepreneurs 0.0671 0.0695 0.0667
TFP growth 0.0161 0.0155 0.0160
GDP 100.0000 100.1299 99.8792
Unemployment 0.0943 0.0786 0.0848
: To maintain aggregate managerial knowhow at the benchmark level, I adjust µ to 2.10071 for the first experiment. Note that in this case
average innate intelligence is lower - leading to reduced TFP growth. Maintaining individuals’ decisions but using the distribution of innate
intelligence from the benchmark model withµ = 2.11 leads to slightly higher TFP growth rates of 1.62% (West) and 1.57%.
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Table A3: Additional Results: Decomposition
Independent no no flexible
country migration subsidies wages
Entrepreneurs in West 0.0699 0.0693 0.0685 0.0670
TFP growth West 0.0159 0.0158 0.0172 0.0162
GDP per capita West 99.1013 97.2065 103.1110 99.2116
Unemployment West 0.0551 0.0551 0.0561 0.0545
Entrepreneurs 0.0667 0.0665 0.0662 0.0670
TFP growth 0.0160 0.0160 0.0159 0.0161
GDP 99.8792 99.6092 98.6967 100.5919
Unemployment 0.0848 0.0760 0.1566 0.0774
: For option (1) I adjust µ to 2.10071 to maintain aggregate managerial knowhow at the benchmark level.
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